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INTRODUCTION 
Gone is the superpower rivalry of the Cold War era and the strategic 
significance it lent to the Middle East. The end of Soviet support has caused 
several Arab governments to realign their foreign policies; Israel is no longer 
necessarily perceived as an enemy but in some circles is seen as a potential 
economic and political partner.1 Clearly a major motivation for expanding 
defence expenditures has therefore been eliminated. Even so, there are still 
gaps in the defence systems of most states in the region, and most countries 
wish to modernize their armed forces. Even the peace process will not stand 
in the way of modernization, and actual defence spending is not expected to 
fall significantly for some time.2 
It is commonly believed that the major constraint on new defence spend-
ing is the poor performance of regional economies and the strain on govern-
ment budgets of maintaining a system of subsidies and social welfare. It 
follows that the pace of arms transfers may slow down as a result of the need 
to conserve resources, but the region is certain to continue spending heavily 
on security, even if the future enemy is more likely to be an Islamist than an 
Israeli.3 
While not disputing that view, this chapter takes another approach. 
Specifically it examines whether and to what extent the eastern 
Mediterranean states and Saudi Arabia have become so accustomed to 
defence expenditures that a reduction in their levels or rates of growth might 
actually result in economic disruption. Clearly if large segments of the 
economy are adversely affected by reduced allocations to the military, there 
will be some limits to the extent to which military cutbacks occur. Whether 
or not the reluctance to make further cuts in defence expenditures will derail 
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the peace process is problematic, but there is no doubt that this phenomenon 
may hamper both economic and political progress. 
LITERATURE SURVEY: THE IMPACT OF DEFENCE 
EXPENDITURES 
A body of conventional wisdom has amassed over the years concerning the 
causes and consequences of Third World militarization. More often than not 
in the academic literature this wisdom has been anecdotal and biased 
towards the standard "guns or butter" metaphor. Since the modem defence 
establishment is a heavy consumer of technical and managerial manpower 
and foreign exchange, resources that are especially scarce in the Third 
World, the conventional argument is that increased defence burdens should 
reduce the overall rate of growth.4 
To test this theory, a rapidly growing body of empirical research has 
attempted to identify the impact of defence spending on various aspects of 
economic development and growth. Numerous studies have grown out of the 
debate but, unfortunately, no consensus has emerged. In the original study, 
Benoit5 found strong evidence to suggest that defence spending encouraged 
the growth of civilian output per capita in less-developed countries. 
This research has gone through various stages and levels of sophistication, 
with the initial studies largely based on ordinary least-squares regression 
techniques using Benoit's data-set for the 1950-65 period. The original 
research analysing Benoit's data-set6 grouped countries on the basis of dis-
criminant analysis with savings and investment used as variables. It was 
found that countries with relatively high levels of savings and investment 
experienced positive impacts on growth, while the impact was statistically 
insignificant for countries experiencing low levels of savings and investment. 
On the other hand, Rothschild7 concluded that increased military expendi-
tures lowered economic growth by reducing exports in 14 OECD countries 
during the period 1956-69. In his examination of 54 developing countries for 
the sample period 1965-73, Lim8 found defence spending to be detrimental 
to economic growth. Deger and Sen,9 Leontief and Duchin, 10 Faini, Annez 
and Taylor, 11 Biswas and Ram, 12 and Grobar and Porter13 also found evi-
dence refuting the claim that defence spending stimulates economic growth. 
In contrast, Wolfs14 research examining the economic impact of Third 
World military expenditures utilising various sub-groupings of countries 
tended to contradict these findings. Much of this research implicitly argues 
that, in certain economic situations, by creating a stable environment it is 
possible that added defence expenditures may stimulate higher rates of 
investment, technological progress, technology transfer and hence increased 
overall growth. 
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Frederiksen and myself15 also used Benoit's sample countries. However, 
our study grouped countries largely on the basis of foreign exchange earn-
ings, import elasticity and productivity of investment. Again, relatively 
unconstrained countries experienced positive impacts on growth stemming 
from defence expenditures, while the countries that were relatively con-
strained in terms of foreign exchange showed a statistically insignificant but 
negative impact. Using a later time period, 1965-73, and again grouping 
developing countries on the basis of their relative savings and investment,16 
we found that the relatively unconstrained countries enjoyed a positive 
impact from defence expenditures. 
These initial studies examined only the impact of defence expenditures on 
growth. More recent analysis in the area has been more sophisticated, 
employing more elaborate statistical devices and/or more subtle country 
groupings. For example, Third World military producers17 during the period 
1970-82 experienced positive impacts from military expenditures on growth, 
investment and savings, but declines in productivity.18 Non-producers experi-
enced declines in growth and investment. In recent years, analysis has 
branched into more complex issues, and utilized both time-series19 and 
simultaneous-equation models estimated by two and three-stage least-
squares regression techniques. These studies introduced the demand for mil-
itary expenditures into the analysis to allow for feedback from the 
macroeconomy to defence.20 Interestingly, the results21 produced by these 
techniques tended to confirm the results obtained from the simpler, more 
naive models. 
In short, the existing body of research demonstrates a consistent pattern 
whereby certain groups of Third World countries - usually the more success-
ful economically, the more stable politically, or those engaged in military 
production22 - derive positive impacts on investment and growth from mili-
tary spending. Those countries less successful economically, more politically 
unstable or lacking a domestic arms industry fail to derive any positive 
economic impacts from defence expenditures. 
Some studies have also identified a number of adverse effects that stem 
from defence expenditures which come at the expense of other forms of 
national expenditure. Such effects obtain even in those countries experienc-
ing higher overall rates of growth from increased allocations to defence. In 
particular, countries with an indigenous arms industry may suffer a deterio-
ration in the distribution of income from added defence expenditures. The 
same may also occur in military regimes as the authorities shift income from 
urban consumers to industrial groups.23 A major limitation of these studies is 
that, by their nature, cross-sectional studies are very aggregative, such that 
applying them to specific countries is hazardous at best. 
Obvio'usly they are also incapable of capturing the dynamics associated 
with time.24 Lebovic and Ishaq's25 study of defence spending in the Middle 
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East attempts to overcome these deficiencies. Using a pooled time-series, 
cross-sectional analysis on various groupings of Middle Eastern states, they 
found that higher military spending tended to suppress economic growth in 
the non-oil states of the Middle East during the 1973-84 period. However, 
while Lebovic and Ishaq drew on time-series data, they were not able to 
incorporate the potential effects of lags between the time defence expendi-
tures occur, and the period of maximum economic impact. 
In this regard, Babin26 has noted that incorporating the time variable into 
the analysis can be critical because some relationships that may exist over 
time disappear in the short run and vice versa. This implies that, at the 
national level, development usually requires a series of changes that occur 
through systems, which involve organizations, agencies, economic structures 
and technological variables. Consequently, as Babin concludes, it un-
justifiable to assume that a country's defence spending will have an imme-
diate, or even short-term, effect on national economic performance. Babin's 
main finding was that while short-run economic impacts of defence expendi-
ture may be nil or even negative, the longer- term effect on growth is likely to 
be positive. 
Along these lines, Kick and Sharda's27 analysis suggests that an increase in 
the military manpower tatio has a significant positive effect on infrastructure 
and social welfare. This impact occurs with a long (12-year) time lag. Kick 
and Sharda also found that the relationship over a 12-year period is positive. 
Militarization, whether measured by expenditures or size of the military, 
does contribute to development. · 
Finally, recent work at the International Monetary Fund28 suggests posi-
tive gains from reduced allocations to the military. The most recent of these 
studies29 identified a substantial long-run "peace dividend" in the form of 
higher capacity output. This, in turn, may result from: (1) markedly lower 
military expenditure levels achieved in most regions during the late 1980s; 
and (2) further military spending cuts that might become possible in the 
future if global peace is sustained and deepened over time. 
THE ISSUE OF CAUSATION 
Nearly all of these studies have implicitly assumed a pattern of causation: 
defence expenditures are either politically and/or strategically driven and 
hence exogenous; or, instead, allocations to the military may simply reflect 
the underlying resource base (the ability to finance) and are hence endoge-
nous. This .is an important point, since many of the contradictory findings on 
militaries' economic impacts stem from differences in model construction, 
while the act of model construction in itself implicitly assumes that defence 
expenditures are either endogenous or exogenous. 
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It follows that before drawing any definitive conclusions as to the impact 
of defence expenditures, one must satisfactorily address the issue of causa-
tion. Fortunately several statistical tests are gaining wider acceptance for this 
purpose. To date, the original and most widely used causality test is one 
developed by Granger.30 
The Granger Test 
Granger defines causality such that X causes (G-C) Y if Y can be predicted 
more accurately in the sense of mean-square error, with the use of past 
values of X than without using past X. Based upon the definition of Granger 
causality, a simply bivariate autoregressive model for defence and gross 
domestic product (GDP) can be specified as follows: 
GDP(t) = c + f a(i')GDP(t- i) + })U)DEF(t - j) + u(t) 6.1 
i=I j=l 
r s 
DEF(t) = c+ Ld(i)DEF(t-1) + 'Le(j)GDP(t-j)+ v(t) 6.2 
i=I j=l 
where DEF = defence expenditures; p, q, rands are lag lengths for each 
variable in the equation; and u and v are serially uncorrelated white-noise 
residuals. By assuming that error terms (u, v) are "nice", ordinary least-
squares (OLS) becomes the appropriate estimation method.31 
Within the framework of unrestricted and restricted models, a joint F-test 
is appropriate for causal detection: 
F = RSS(r)- RSS(u) I (df(r)-df(u)) 6.3 
RSS(u) I df(u) 
where RSS(r) and RSS(u) are the residual sum of squares of restricted and 
unrestricted models, respectively; and df(r) and df(u) are, respectively, the 
degrees of freedom in restricted and unrestricted models. 
The Granger test detects causal directions in the following manner: first, 
unidirectional causality from DEF to GDP if the F-test rejects the null 
hypothesis that past values of DEF in equation (6.1) are insignificantly differ-
ent from zero, and if the F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that past 
values of GDP in equation (6.2) are insignificantly different from zero. That 
is, DEF causes GDP, but GDP does not cause DEF. Unidirectional causality 
runs from GDP to DEF if the reverse is true. Second, bidirectional causality 
runs between DEF and GDP if both F-test statistics reject the null hypothe-
ses in equations (6.1) and (6.2). Finally, no causality exists between DEF 
and GDP if we cannot reject both null hypotheses at the conventional 
significance level. 
104 Budgetary Consequences of Middle East Peace 
. 
Joerding32 has tested the defence-growth hypothesis using Granger causal-
ity methods. That is, he tested for the assumed exogeneity of defence 
budgets. Using a pooled sample containing 15 observations from each of 
57 countries, Joerding employed a multivariate model which also included 
investment and government spending and concluded that defence expendi-
tures are not strongly exogenous and that previous studies were flawed. 
While Joerding's work provides insight into the nature of the relationship 
between defence and growth, there are three issues that merit further atten-
tion, as suggested by LaCivita and Frederiksen.33 First, Joerding lumps all 
countries into one sample. This suggests a commonality of causal relation-
ships across diverse economic environments. As Frederiksen and myself have 
demonstrated, splitting a pooled sample into separate groups (in their case 
based on the level of relative resource constraints) can lead to quite different 
results.34 Second, by aggregating the sample, Joerding assumed a common 
lag structure for all of the countries in the sample (in his study, four years on 
the defence and growth variables). It seems reasonable to hypothesize that if 
a causal relationship does exist (either defence to growth or growth to 
defence) one could expect the time lags to differ from country to country. 
And finally, Joerging's method for choosing lag length was ad hoc. 
The results of Granger causality tests depend critically on the choice of 
lag length.35 If the chosen length is less than the true lag length, the omission 
of relevant lags can cause bias. If the chosen lag is greater than the true lag 
length, the inclusion of irrelevant lags causes estimates to be inefficient. 
While Joerding chose his lag lengths based on preliminary partial autocorre-
lation methods, there is no a priori reason to assume lag lengths equal for all 
of our sample countries. For example, in a study of the Philippines, 
Frederiksen and LaCivita36 found no statistical relationship between growth 
and defence when both variables had a lag equal to four. With a lag length of 
two periods, however, growth caused defence. Since both lag lengths are 
arbitrary, one cannot form an objective conclusion as to the direction of 
causation. 
The Hsaio Procedure 
To overcome such difficulties noted above, Hsaio37 developed a systematic 
method for assigning lags. This method combines Granger causality and 
Akaike's final prediction error (FPE), the (asymptotic) mean-square predic-
tion error, to determine the optimum lag for each variable. In an article 
examining the problems encountered in choosing lag lengths, Thornton and 
Batten38 found Hsaio's method to be superior to both arbitrary lag length 
selection and several other systematic procedures for determining lag length. 
The first step in Hsaio's procedure is to perform a series of autoregressive 
regressions on the dependent ...ariable. In the first regression, the dependent 
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variable has a lag of one, and this increases by one in each succeeding regres-
sion. Here, we estimate M regressions of the form: 
m 
G(t) = a+ L,b(t- l)G(t- i) + e(i) 6.4 
i=I 
where the values of m range from 1 fo M. For each regression, we compute 
the FPE in the following manner: 
FPE(m) = T+m+l ESS(m)IT 
T-m-1 
6.5 
where: Tis the sample size, and FPE(m) and ESS(m) are the final prediction 
error and the sum of squared errors, respectively. The optimal lag length, 
m*, is the lag length which produces the lowestFPE. Having determined m*, 
additional regressions expand the equation with the lags on the other vari-
able added sequentially in the same manner used to determine m *. Thus we 
estimate four regressions of the form: 
m· n 
G(t) =a+ L,b(t-l)G(t-1)+ L,c(t-l)D(t-1)+ e(i) 6.6 
i=I i=I 
with n ranging from one to four. Computing the final prediction error for 
each regression as: 
FPE(m*,n) = T+m*+n+lESS(m*,n)IT 
T-m*-n- 1 
6.7 
we choose the optimal lag length for D, n* as the lag length which produces 
the lowest FPE. Using the final prediction error to determine lag length is 
equivalent to using a series of F-tests with variable levels of significance.39 
The first term measures the estimation error and the second term meas-
ures the modelling error. The FPE criterion has a certain optimality prop-
erty40 that "balances the risk due to bias when a lower order is selected and 
the risk due to increases in the variance when a higher order is selected." As 
noted by Judge et al.,41 an intuitive reason for using the FPE criterion is that 
longer lags increase the first term but decrease the RSS of the second term, 
and thus the two opposing forces are optimally balanced when their product 
reaches its minimum. 
Depending on the value of the final prediction errors, four cases are 
possible: 
(1) Defence causes growth. This occurs when the prediction error for growth 
falls when the equation includes defence. In addition, when growth is 
a~ded to the defence equatiot'l, the final prediction error increases; 
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(2) Growth causes defence. This occurs when the prediction error of growth 
increases when defence is added to the regression equation for growth, 
and is reduced when growth is added to the regression equation for 
defence; 
(3) Feedback. This occurs when the final prediction error decreases when 
defence is added to the growth equation, and the final prediction error 
decreases when growth is added to the defence equation; or 
(4) No relationship. This occurs when the final prediction error increases 
when defence is added to the growth equation, and also increases when 
growth is added to the defence equation. 
METHODOLOGY42 
Several conceptual problems remain. Most economic time-series are non-
stationary. Stationarity is an important property as it guarantees that there 
are no fundamental changes in the structure of the process that would render 
prediction difficult or impossible. To overcome this problem, I have used the 
rates of growth of each variable in the estimated equations.43 Regressing 
these transformed series on a constant and time produced coefficients that 
were different from zero for all countries. Similar regressions of the untrans-
formed levels indicated the presence of a trend. 
The region's recent defence expenditures show great diversity (see Table 
6.1) with few generalizations possible. Clearly, progress in the Arab-Israeli 
peace process has yet to be reflected in the region's attitude towards defence 
issues.44 In many countries weapons systems are being upgraded and 
expanded, and gaps in national defences are being filled with new acquisi-
tions. Across the Middle East, defence budgets account for anything from 
3.3 per cent to 14 per cent of GDP: the European average is 1.85 per cent of 
GDP. 
Of course one must be wary of over-generalizing. Israel's economy is fun-
damentally different from those of other countries in the region; it is more 
akin to some of the European economies. Within the Arab Middle East 
there are important differences between the major oil-exporting countries 
and those with far less or no oil, and there are also important country differ-
ences aside from oil.45 In the sections below, the analysis has been confined 
to the economies of Israel Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, where, as 
Eliyahu Kanovsky notes, the relationship between economic stagnation and 
other socio-economic ills, along with the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, 
together constitute a grave threat to the longer-term durability of Arab-
Israeli peace agreements.46 
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Table 6.1 Defence spending: Middle East and North Africa, 1985-95 
(US$ million) 
Country 1985 1993 1994 1995 Growth Rate 
1985/95 1993/95 
Sample Countries 
Saudi 23 603 16 450 14 275 13 200 -5.6 -10.4 
Egypt 3400 2480 2 710 2 960 -1.4 9.2 
Israel 6640 6200 6700 6900 0.4 1.9 
Jordan 791 430 433 448 -5.5 -24.7 
Syria 4580 2380 2460 2620 -5.4 -24.4 
GCC 
Bahrain 198 251 248 253 2.5 0.4 
Kuwait 2360 3 010 3 090 2910 2.1 -1.7 
Oman 2834 1920 1900 1590 -5.6 -9.0 
Qatar 394 330 302 326 -1.9 --0.6 
Other Middle East 
Iran 18 700 4860 2300 2460 -18.4 -28.9 
Iraq 16 910 2600 2700 n/a n/a n/a 
Lebanon 263 275 310 343 2.7 14.2 
Yemen 1041 355 318 345 -10.5 --42.4 
North Africa 
Algeria 1250 1360 1130 1330 0.6 8.5 
Libya 1 775 1090 967 960 --6.0 -26.5 
Morocco 850 1090 1230 1210 3.6 19.3 
Tunisia 550 231 225 262 -7.1 44.9 
Source: The Military Balance, 1994-95 (London: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies), 1995. 
RESULTS 
The results show great diversity across the sample of countries. In fact, no 
one pattern dominates the findings, suggesting that generalizations about 
the economic motivations for increasing or decreasing defence expendi-
tures are of little value. The alleged peace dividend may be high for the 
region as a whole, but for several individual countries it is problematic that 
a reduction in defence expenditures would provide a major boom to their 
economies. 
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Israel 
The patterns for Israel are particularly interesting and in many respects are 
more complex than for the other countries examined. The dominant pattern 
is one of feedback, whereby increases in defence expenditures impact posi-
tively on the economy (equation 1, Table 6.2). In turn, economic growth 
tends to generate additional resources to allow a further expansion in 
defence. The same pattern also holds for the defence burden (equation 2, 
Table 6.2). That is, an increase in the growth of the share of defence in GNP 
tends to increase the subsequent rate of growth in GDP. Here however the 
link between increased defence burdens and GDP is considerably weaker 
than the simple Defence ~ GDP linkages. This pattern seems to hold mainly 
when defence is not increasing its budgetary share (more specifically the 
growth in defence share of the budget). When this occurs (Equation 3, Table 
6.2) there is a weak reduction in the growth of GDP. Finally, a particularly 
strong linkage occurs between increases in armed forces (per 1000 popula-
tion) and GDP. Here, increases in the growth of the armed forces exert a 
strong (Equation 4, Table 6.2) stimulus to GDP. This stimulus occurs 
quickly, with the optimal lag around one year. 
These findings suggest that defence expenditures in Israel have acted as a 
positive stimulus to overall economic expansion, but the precise nature of 
these links is unclear. However, it appears that the government has little 
incentive from a purely economic point of view in reducing defence expendi-
ture. Presumably the reduction in defence expenditures would have to be 
replaced by some other type of expenditure to avoid increased unemploy-
ment and a slowdown in economic activity. 
The ability of defence expenditures to stimulate the economy is consistent 
with a model of foreign aid recently developed by McGuire,47 in which foreign 
aid creates several price and income movements in the recipient country. For 
Israel, aid from the United States has created an indirect stimulus to invest-
ment via the complementarity between investment and defence. In addition, 
the aid provides significant resources via tax relief to the private sector. 
Subsequently these resources flow into capital formation: "It appears in 
summary, that a significant fraction of United States aid goes to support 
capital formation in Israel via this diversion of resources."48 In short, United 
States military grants to Israel have not only allowed the country to increase 
military expenditures rapidly in the short run, but, perhaps more importantly, 
to increase them in a way not detrimental to investment and economic growth. 
Jordan 
In contrast to Israel, Jordanian defence expenditures have tended to respond 
to an expanding resource ba;e; that is, they have been passive in that they 
Table 6.2 Defence expenditure, causal linkages with the macroeconomy: Israel, Jordan and Syria 
Causal Time Period Direction of Optimal Lag 
Relationship Causation (years) strength 
Rates of Growth: Measures of Defence and GDP 
Israel 
1. Defence/GDP 1970-93 [Feedback] 
MILX~GDP(+) (3) Moderate 
GDP~MILX ( +) (1) Weak 
2. Defence burden/GDP 1970-93 [Feedback] 
MILX~GDP(+) (3) Weak 
GDP~MILX ( +) (1) Weak 
3. '"Defence budget share/GDP 1970-93 MILX~GDP (-) (1) Weak 
4. Armed forces/GDP 1970-93 AF~GDP(+) (1) Strong 
Jordan 
5. Defence/GDP 1970-94 GDP~MILX ( +) (3) Strong 
6. Armed forces/GDP 1970-93 AF~GDP(-) (1) Weak 
7. Arms imports share of total imports/GDP 1970-93 No Relationship 
Syria 
8. Defence/GDP 1970-90 MILX~GDP (-) (1) Weak 
9. Defence burden/GDP 1970-90 MILX~GDP (-) (1) Weak 
10. Armed forces/GDP 1970-90 GDP~AF(+) (1) Weak 
11. Defence budget share/GDP 1970-90 MILX~GDP (-) (1) Moderate 
Note: Summary of results obtained from Granger causality tests using a Hsaio procedure to determine the optimal lag; i.e., a 
four-year lag indicates that most of the impact from the expenditures or GDP in any one year tends to be distributed over four 
successive years. ..... 0 
'° 
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have tended to respond to underlying economic trends rather than initiating 
or modifying those trends. On an overall basis, increases in the armed forces 
have had a fairly negative impact on GDP. While one could only speculate as 
to the cause of this pattern, the lost output stemming from shifting workers 
from civilian to military activities would seem to be a logical place to start. 
However, it is clear that the country could significantly reduce its allocations 
to defence without incurring the risk of deflation. Conceivably in Jordan's 
case the major problems associated with a lasting Middle East peace agree-
ment would be what to do with the resources that do not have to be ear-
marked for defence. In a recent assessment of the Jordanian economy the 
World Bank argued that in the short run, while peace may offer Jordan some 
immediate benefits arising primarily from an investment-led boom in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, it also carries substantial risks to macroeconomic 
stability.49 The real question then is whether the country has the capacity to 
manage these increased risks through improved macroeconomic manage-
ment and further efforts to strengthen the financial system. 
Syria 
In contrast to the patterns found in Israel and Jordan, defence expenditures 
have had a generally negative, albeit weak impact on the Syrian economy. 
On the one hand, this impact has tended to be short, averaging one year, but 
it is consistent across defence expenditures, the defence burden and the 
share of defence in the central government budget. On the other hand, 
the increased economic growth appears to provide additional resources to 
expand the armed forces. 
Egypt 
The dominant pattern in Egypt (Table 6.3) over this period is one of no sta-
tistically significant links between defence expenditures and the overall 
economy. It appears that increased defence expenditures tend to produce a 
stimulus for increased capital formation, but these linkages are weak. The 
ensuing link between investment and GDP is rather strong, making the 
overall impact of defence expenditures difficult to assess. 
Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabian patterns (Table 6.4) are more complex in that it is necessary 
to distinguish between total GDP and that of non-oil GDP. Given its high oil 
component, it is safe to assume that GDP could be affected by defence only 
under highly unusual circumstances. Therefore, it makes sense to test the 
impact defence may have had on the non-oil component of GDP. That is, did 
Table 6.3 Defence expenditure, causal linkages with the macroeconomy: Egypt 
Causal 
Relationship 
1. Defence expenditures/GDP 
2. Defence burden/GDP 
3. Armed forces/GDP 
4. Defence expenditures investment 
5. Defence burden/investment 
6. Armed forces/investment 
7. Investment/GDP 














MILX-+Investment ( +) 
MILX-+ Investment ( +) 
[Feedback) 
Investment-+MILX ( +) 
MILX-+INVEST ( +) 

















Table 6.4 Defence expenditure, causal linkages with the macroeconomy: Saudi Arabia 
Causal Time Period Direction of Optimal Lag 
Relationship Causation (years) strength 
Gross Domestic Product 
1. Defence/GDP 1970-91 GDP~MILX ( +) (1) Weak 
2. Defence burden/GDP 1970-91 GDP~MILX ( +) (1) Weak 
3. Armed forces/GDP 1970-91 No relationship 
Non-Oil GDP 
4. Defence/non-oil GDP 1970-91 MILX~GDP( +) (2) Moderate 
5. Defence burden/non-oil GDP 1970-91 MILX~GDP ( +) . (1) Moderate 
6. Armed forces/non-oil GDP 1970-91 Armed forces~GDP ( +) (2) Moderate 
7. Goverment investment/non-oil GDP 1970-91 [Feedback] 
lnvestment~GDP ( +) (2) Weak 
GDP~Investment (-) (1) Weak 
8. Private investment/non-oil GDP 1970-91 [Feedback] 
Investment~GDP ( +) (1) Strong 
GDP~Investment ( +) (1) Weak 
Private Investment 
9. Defence expenditure/private investment 1970-91 MILX~Investment ( +) (3) Weak 
10. Government investment/private investment 1970-91 [Feedback] 
Private~Public ( +) (1) Moderate 
Public~Private ( +) (1) Weak 
Note: See the note to Table 6.2. 
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defence create linkages with the local economy or was it in competition with 
the private sector for resources? The results are as follows. 
As anticipated, causation is largely from GDP to defence; that is, an 
increased resource base is used to fund additional allocations to the military. 
The impact here is quick, but not necessarily strong (Equations 1 and 2, 
Table 6.4). This may be due in part to the volatility of oil revenues and the 
stability in defence procurement contracts, once signed. That is, during 
periods of high oil revenues, contracts may be let that require expenditures 
over multiple years. Fluctuations in oil revenues would then mask this under-
lying linkage. 
For non-oil revenues the pattern is largely one of defence expenditures 
providing a mild stimulus to the economy. Again, this stimulus occurs fairly 
quickly with an average lag of about two years. In the Saudi Arabian case the 
impact of private investment and government investment on GDP were also 
examined. Here it was found that private investment had a strong impact on 
non-oil GDP, with public investment a much weaker linkage. Of the three, 
defence expenditures were stronger than government investment as a stimu-
lus to the domestic economy, but weaker than private investment. 
While the actual Saudi Arabian defence expenditures appear to be linked 
to oil revenues and can be expected to decline, the country does appear to 
derive some domestic benefits from increased allocations to the military. 
Whether these are linkages with the country's offset programme are unclear. 
The fact is, these linkages appear stronger than they would be with govern-
ment investment, for instance. Clearly the main problem for the Saudis will 
entail finding ways to replace defence expenditures (which are not likely to 
increase due to budgetary constraints) with other types of expenditures, such 
as private investment. This is a goal of both the current and the prior devel-
opment plans. However, given the low productivity of capital investment, the 
country would apparently gain little from diverting expenditures from the 
military to further expansion in infrastructure. 
CONCLUSION 
These results suggest the difficulties in generalizing over possible peace divi-
dends or even the willingness of countries to reduce defence expenditures as 
part of a Middle East peace process. Israel and Saudi Arabia probably have 
the least to gain from reduced defence expenditures; they were the only 
countries to experience a consistently positive linkage from defence to GDP, 
although the Saudi links are from defence to non-oil GDP. Egypt does not 
appear to gain any direct growth benefits from defence expenditures; 
however, there is some evidence that increased defence may stimulate 
capital investment. That country might benefit from a more detailed analysis 
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to discern the nature of this linkage and whether or not other types of gov-
ernment expenditure might provide a stimulus of the same order of magni-
tude. Jordan would be the next 'most likely country to gain from reduced 
defence expenditures. As noted, this effect would not be a true peace divi-
dend, since defence expenditures do not impact negatively on the economy. 
However, it is clear that Jordanians have many opportunities to productively 
use the resources that might have ordinarily gone to the military. Syria 
appears to be the country with the greatest economic stake in a lasting 
Middle East peace. Syria was the one country that derived negative impacts 
on economic growth from defence expenditures, and as a result it is the only 
candidate for a true peace dividend. 
In general, these findings support Kanovsky's contentions50 that (1) there 
is very little likelihood of any further significant reductions in regional mili-
tary expenditures; and (2) that even if such reductions were to take place, 
there are many other impediments to economic growth in the Arab Middle 
East: in particular, adverse economic policies and poor political processes. 
His feeling is that peace agreements, however desirable in their own right, 
will not solve the basic economic problems of these countries. Only far-
reaching changes in economic policy can extricate them from stagnation, 
unemployment and underemployment, debilitating poverty and a widening 
and dangerous gap between the few rich and the many poor. 
APPENDIX: TESTING FOR UNIT ROOTS AND CO-INTEGRATION 
As noted above, the time series must be stationary to yield valid Granger 
tests.51 In this regard the finding of a unit root in a time series indicates 
non-stationarity. 
In a well-known paper, Dickey and Fuller52 suggested a method for 
computing a test for a unit root in a time series, and presented critical values 
for their proposed tests with and without the trend variable included. 
Dickey- Fuller tests were performed using PCGive Version 7. In a simple 
case where: 
xt = a + bxt - 1 + el 
where b = l, which generates a random walk (with drift if a not equal to 0). 
Here, the autoregressive coefficient is unitary and stationarity is violated. A 
process with no unit or explosive roots is said to be /(O); a process is /(d) if it 
needs to be differenced d times to become /(0). The Durbin-Watson statistic 
(DW)for the level of a variable offers one simple characterization of this 
integrated property. For example, if xt is a random walk, DW will be very 
small. If" is white noise, DW will be around 2. Very low DW values thus 
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indicate that a transformed model may be desirable, perhaps including a 
mixture of differenced and disequilibrium variables. 
The tests53 consisted of first performing the Dickey-Fuller procedure on 
the logs of all variables: Here, the t-test on the lagged value is the relevant 
statistic, with critical values provided in MacKinnon,54 and Davidson and 
MacKinnon55• As noted above, these tests indicated non-stationarity. Next, 
tests were performed on the first differences of the log values. In all cases 
these were significant at the 95 per cent level (and often at the 99 per cent 
level). 
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